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Nonunion Employee Representation in North America: Diversity, Controversy, and 
Uncertain Future 
 
Daphne G. Taras and Bruce E. Kaufman 
 
ABSTRACT 
The diverse conceptual perspectives and practical experiences with nonunion employee 
representation (NER) in the United States and Canada are reviewed. We first propose a 6-
dimensional descriptive schema to categorize observed NER practices.  Dimensions of diversity 
include (1) form, (2) function, (3) subjects, (4) representation characteristics, (5) extent of power, 
and (6) degree of permanence. We then turn to the NER controversy, which is a tangled skein 
consisting of many different threads of values and prescriptions. To unbundle the controversy, 
we develop four “faces” of NER – (1) evolutionary voice, (2) unity of interest; (3) union 
avoidance, and (4) complementary voice -- so that future research can more consciously test 
the validity of competing perspectives with hard data. Generalizing about NER is problematic 
because of these many dimensions of diversity, and because NER is viewed through different 
ideological and conceptual lenses.  We conclude that NER’s future trajectory is uncertain due to 
conflicting trends but in the short-run is most likely to remain a modest-sized phenomenon.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last decade the topic of collective employee representation in nonunion firms has broken 
the surface in North American1 industrial relations (IR).  For half a century, it was almost 
completely ignored in Canada and relegated to a modest number of critical studies in American 
labour history.  The situation reflected a widespread consensus in the IR academic communities 
of both countries (e.g., Bernstein, 1960; Gitelman, 1988) that nonunion employee representation 
plans (aka, “company unions”) were largely employer-promulgated shams operated for socially 
retrograde purposes of union avoidance and worker cooptation.   
 Beginning largely in the mid-1990s, we and several other scholars (e.g., Nelson 1993; 
                                                 
1 Apologies to Mexico.  In this article North America is meant to describe only the US and Canada. 
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Fairris, 1997) decided to take a fresh look at the performance of nonunion employee 
representation (NER) in North America in both its historical and contemporary settings.  On our 
part, this effort was spurred by two major developments.  The first was the long-term decline in 
the traditional form of employee voice brought on by the substantial erosion of private sector 
union density, particularly in the United States (from 35 percent in 1950 to 8 percent in 2005).  
The second was the concomitant emergence and growth of a substantial “participation/ 
representation gap” in the workforce (Freeman and Rogers, 1999).  We thought these trends 
suggested the need for alternative forms of employee voice and one candidate worthy of 
exploration was collective representation in nonunion settings. 
It is fair to say that our initial foray into NER was greeted by many of our fellow IR 
academics with reactions ranging from skepticism to hostility. 2   Had we crossed over to the 
dark side?  The answer is No, at least if one has an open mind, and a decade later there has 
emerged a discernible mellowing of attitudes and a groundswell of interest in NER.  Yet, at the 
same time, few subjects in North American industrial relations remain as controversial, divisive, 
murky, and freighted with passion.  Why is this? 
In this article we explore these matters and attempt to offer some reconciliation, or at 
least greater understanding.  In particular, our thesis has three parts.  First, we maintain that 
NER is a far more diverse and complex institution than the stereotypical “company union.”  In 
particular, we argue in Section II that NER varies along six distinct dimensions: form, function, 
                                                 
2 In 1996, a major US scholar turned his back on Taras after learning only that her research topic involved collective 
representation for nonunion workers. He said, “If I were your PhD supervisor, I would not have allowed you to 
study such a topic.”   At about that time, US arbitrators who accepted NER (“employer promulgated arbitration”) 
cases were labeled “rats, leaving a sinking ship” by union supporters at a National Academy of Arbitrators 
conference.  At an Industrial Relations Research Association (IRRA) conference the NER agenda (Taras 1998) was 
attacked: “It is an unseemly and dangerous topic,” said a scholar, “You shouldn’t go there.”  At an IRRA panel 
session organized by Kaufman featuring a presentation by Delta Air Lines managers and employees on the 
company’s NER system, a member of the AFL-CIO surreptitiously taped the session and some audience members 
took a hostile attitude toward the event. The officers of the University and College Labor Education Association in 
the US withdrew the group’s sponsorship of the Second Innovative Teaching in Human Resources and Industrial 
Relations conference (1988), organized by Kaufman, because of his advocacy of a more liberal legal treatment of 
NER.       
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topics, representational mode, extent of power, and degree of permanence.  Second, we also 
maintain that whether one reaches a favourable or negative verdict on NER depends crucially 
on the interpretive “frame of reference” used to evaluate NER.  To develop this argument, in 
Section III we advance a “four faces” typology that individually and collectively represent the 
various purposes and effects of NER.  Third, and finally, in Section IV we also suggest that the 
future of NER is uncertain and its incidence is likely to remain modest-scale – at least in its full-
blown enterprise form – due to a welter of conflicting and offsetting benefits and costs.  All of 
these points are developed through a review of historical and contemporary NER studies, 
limited largely to the experience of Canada and the US but, hopefully, with insight and relevance 
for NER in Europe and Australasia 
 
NER IN NORTH AMERICA 
Definition:  NER may be generically defined as:  one or more employees who act in an agency 
function for other employees in dealings with management over issues of mutual concern, 
including the terms and conditions under which people work.  Selected workers’ representatives 
meet with managers, usually in committee-type structures in which communication and 
exchange of thoughts is fostered.  Representatives usually are internal to the company and 
serve leadership roles for limited terms.  NER is based on a quid pro quo between managers 
and workers.  In setting up such plans, management expects that the plans will encourage 
cooperative, advisory, and consultative modes of interaction so that friction points between 
management and employees can be lessened or eliminated.  In taking on a representational 
function, workers expect that NER will provide a meaningful forum for employee voice, a 
capacity to influence managerial decision-making, and recognition by managers that workers 
have a right to respectful treatment.    
Pateman’s (1970) distinction between direct and indirect forms of employee participation 
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draws a useful line between forms of employee engagement that we consider to be NER versus 
those outside our ambit.  Direct participation is one-on-one, face-to-face interaction between 
employees and their management counterparts; indirect participation is where the views and 
concerns of a body of employees are communicated to management by one or more employees 
selected to represent or act in an agency function for the larger group. Direct forms of 
participation tend to be small-scale and decentralized, such as quality circles and self-managed 
work teams. Exceptions occur, however, as with company-wide “town hall” meetings. In either 
case, they lack a representational function and thus are not a form of NER. Indirect forms of 
participation, of which NER is the typical form, can also be small-scale and decentralized, such 
as a safety committee or peer review panel, but can also be company-wide or even industry-
wide. Examples of the latter include plant-wide joint councils, employee professional 
associations, and trade unions.  
Institutional Context:  NER was historically, and continues to be today, an important 
element in North American industrial relations.  Unlike the pre-World War II era, however, 
systematic information on the prevalence and form of NER is largely absent. In the 1920s and 
1930s NER covered several million workers and in some years had nearly the same density as 
trade unions. For this reason the Canadian and American governments, along with groups such 
as the National Industrial Conference Board, were intensely interested in NER and gathered 
extensive data on it.3  These data, supplemented with case study evidence, have over the past 
half-century provided the basis for numerous excellent scholarly studies on the early 
performance of NER in Canadian and American industry (Ozanne 1967; Jacoby 1997; Nelson 
1988; Gitelman 1988; Brody 1960; Gray and Gullett 1973; Grenier 1988, Cohen 1990; Chase 
                                                 
3 The Canadian Department of Labour reviewed “joint councils” in 1921, and published in-depth examinations of 
various company plans in Labour Gazette.  Authoritative American studies were undertaken by the National 
Industrial Conference Board in 1919, 1922 and 1933. The US Department of Labor commissioned a review of 
“company unions”, sending out 43,000 questionnaires and employing staff to visit 125 firms (US BLS 1937).   
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1947).  
After World War II, however, NER largely faded from sight in both countries. The reason 
has to do with both the shift in legal treatment of NER in the United States and the widespread 
organization of industry by trade unions. As unionism swept across the mass production 
industries in the 1930s-to-1950s, NER was displaced and overshadowed by independent 
collective bargaining and scholars and government agencies lost interest in it. Regarding the 
law, the complexities of the two countries’ legal treatment of NER are covered in considerable 
depth elsewhere (e.g., the introductory chapter in Kaufman and Taras 2000a; Kaufman 1999, 
LeRoy 1999, Maryott, 1997).  Suffice it here to say that in the US the 1935 Wagner Act 
(National Labor Relations Act - NLRA) largely banned NER as a reaction against the real and 
alleged abuses and shortcomings of “company unions” during the early New Deal period. 
Although a decade later Canada also adopted most of the Wagner Act model, it did not follow 
the US and ban NER (Taras 1997a, 2006).  A variety of reasons explain this discrepancy, but 
one worth noting is that at the time (the early 1940s) the Canadian prime minister was William 
Lyon Mackenzie King who in the late 1910s had played an instrumental role in promulgating 
NER plans in both countries (Kaufman, 2003a, Taras, 2000a).  
 How significant and widespread is NER today?  The only data available come from an 
exploratory 1996 survey on the subject by Lipsetz and Meltz (2000). The survey asked 1,750 
adults in the US and 1,495 in Canada a detailed and lengthy set of questions about their 
workplaces, including several about NER. They found that about twenty percent of nonunion 
employees in each country worked in an enterprise with some form of collective representation 
other than an independent union.4 Fifteen percent of nonunion workers in the US and 14 
percent in Canada reported they were covered by this NER system. Compared to union density 
                                                 
4 These data should be treated as suggestive estimates until replicated with another nationally representative survey 
using more extensive and refined questions on forms and incidence of NER.  
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in the US private sector of 8 percent, these data suggest that more American workers are 
employed in enterprises with NER than with collective bargaining. (This situation is not true in 
Canada, given a private sector union density rate of 18 percent.) More than half the American 
respondents who reported that their companies have NER plans also claim that these plans 
allow discussion of compensation and benefits issues – a surprising result since this type of 
interaction is prohibited under American labor law.  The figure was only fractionally higher 
among Canadian respondents where the law permits such discussion. 
 
DIVERSITY IN NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRSENTATION  
North America has no legally prescribed institutional form or procedure for NER.  By contrast, in 
the unionized sector a complex body of statutory rules, agency regulations, and court rulings 
provide extensive structure for union-management relations.  For example, North American 
unions obtain exclusive bargaining rights once they can demonstrate they have the majority 
support of appropriate groups of workers.  Union-management relations are presumed to be 
adversarial and as a result there are many rules governing good faith bargaining, specifying 
unfair labour practices, and regulating industrial disputes.  Also providing contrast, the dominant 
form of NER in Europe, the works council, is likewise embedded in a detailed legal structure.   
 NER is an umbrella term for an unusually diverse set of forms and practices.  There are 
different dimensions of NER -- forms, functions, topics, representation modes, extent of power, 
and degree of permanence  -- and within each dimension there exists considerable variation. 
Exhibit 1 captures the diversity of the NER realm.  
<INSERT EXHIBIT 1> 
(1) Forms/Structures:  A glance down the first column of Exhibit 1 shows that there are 
many ways of providing NER at the workplace.  The column starts from the small-scale forms of 
representation and works down to the more complex types.  Some forms are ad hoc or informal, 
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while others are long-standing and quite complex.  Most committees or advisory groups operate 
at the shopfloor or department level, such as a joint safety committee. However, other forms of 
NER, such as a plant committee or joint industrial council (JIC), cover all departments in a plant 
or company and often provide access to high-level executives or even the Board of Directors.  
Also distinctive, while employers most often create NER bodies, in some cases workers take the 
initiative and create and run these plans. Examples include identity-based groups for women, 
minorities, gay/lesbian workers (Helfgott, 2000) and employee professional associations 
(Verma, 2000).    
The highest level and most formally structured type of NER, such as a modern-day JIC 
or 1920s-style employee representation plan, comes closest to mirroring a traditional labour 
union. These plans tended to be quite formal with elected worker representatives operating 
under a constitution that sets out the NER systems’ forms, functions and procedures.  Critics 
often label this form of NER a “company union,” a term that now has clear-cut negative 
connotations.  The origin of these NER plans was in the industrial democracy movement of the 
1910s, most famously represented by the “industrial government” plan advocated by John 
Leitch and the “joint committee” plan pioneered by John D. Rockefeller Jr. and Mackenzie King 
(King 1918; Leitch, 1919; Rockefeller, 1924; Gitelman 1988; Kaufman, 2000b; MacDowell, 
2000; Selekman and Van Kleeck 1924; La Dame 1930). In the 1920s there were nearly two 
million American workers covered by large-scale NER plans, particularly in Welfare Capitalist 
companies operating within the Rockefeller orbit. Passage of the NLRA in 1935 forced most 
companies to disband their representation plans, or convert them into an independent local 
union (Jacoby, 2000; Estreicher, 2000).  Because the Canadian federal and provincial laws did 
not incorporate such a ban, JIC-type plans continued to be practiced in Canada and exist today.  
Prominent Canadian examples are Imperial Oil’s JIC and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s 
Div-Rep system (Taras, 2000b; MacDougall, 2000). In the US this type of NER plan became 
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nearly extinct, with a few notable exceptions. One example is in the airline industry (not covered 
by the NLRA) where several nonunion companies have operated company-wide representation 
plans. The most publicized case is Delta Air Lines’ Board Council and system of departmental 
forums and councils (Kaufman 2003c, Cone 2000).  In the manufacturing sector (covered by the 
NLRA), the Polaroid Corporation and Donnelly Corporation operated large-scale representation 
plans into the 1990s until they were forced by rulings of the US National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) to disband them (Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations 1994; 
Leibowitz 1988; Kaufman 1999).   
Another notable exception is the Crown Cork and Seal Corporation (National Labor 
Relations Board, 2001). Its NER system was recently challenged but the NLRB ruled it is legally 
permissible. The company successfully argued that the various forms of NER were an integral 
part of its “Socio-Tech” production system and thus bilateral dealings over terms and conditions 
of employment were incidental to the larger purpose of coordinating production. The employee 
production teams, for example, deal with a wide variety of workplace issues that involve terms 
and conditions of employment, such as scheduling training, attendance, safety, and discipline 
and discharge.  A higher-level Organizational Review Board also monitors plant policies to 
ensure uniformity of application, and may suggest modifications to terms and conditions of 
employment.  In other cases considered by the NLRB these examples of NER typically did not 
pass legal scrutiny. 
 The majority of NER forms in column 1 are "management dominated" in the sense that 
they are created and operated by the employer. As earlier noted, another aspect of diversity is 
that some forms of NER are initiated by employees. The most important example is the 
employees’ professional/advocacy group. Engineers, doctors and other professionals have a 
long history of organization based on the collective interests of the occupational group.  They 
gather resources, offer benefits, and provide important services to their members.  (See 
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Verma’s 2000 discussion of nonunion nurses).  There is a growing use of the Internet to 
establish employment rights and safeguard employee interests (Diamond and Freeman 2002; 
Taras and Gesser 2002).  The American organization “9 to 5” represents and lobbies on behalf 
of working women, sometimes at the level of the individual employer. There also are employee 
groups that represent workers who do not in some jurisdictions have the right to unionize under 
the law (e.g., lawyers and other professionals, managers, agricultural workers).   
(2) Functions: Just as NER comes in many different shapes and sizes, so too does it 
seek to serve a variety of different functions, listed in column 2 of Exhibit 1.  One of the most 
common reasons that firms run NER systems is to improve the communication flow between 
workers and managers and provide workers with various forms of voice (Dundon, Wilkinson, 
Marchington, and Ackers, 2004).  NER facilitates a two-way flow of communication and 
information exchange between management and workers.  Particularly in large companies NER 
can help bridge the huge gap that separates top executives from shopfloor workers, ensuring 
that communication is both more rapid and less filtered and distorted (Basken, 2000; Kaufman, 
2003c). A downside of such “skip-level” reporting, however, is that it often causes discomfort for 
foremen and supervisors who feel left-out or caught in the squeeze. As a result, they often 
tacitly oppose or actively sabotage NER.  Finally, NER also facilitates more personal contact 
between managers and workers, counteracting the deadening effect of bureaucracy. For these 
reasons NER is more often adopted in large-size firms (Kaufman and Levine 2000). 
Another function of NER is to provide greater workplace justice and more effective 
dispute resolution. The NER plans of the 1920s, for example, often acted as a grievance 
system, sometimes culminating in arbitration by a top-level executive. Modern NER plans 
continue this function, although they rarely utilize third-party arbitrators (McCabe, 1988).  Most 
dispute resolution within NER plans occurs at lower levels of the firm and emphasizes 
consultation and mediation. Unresolved disputes are passed up the line in a multi-stage 
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grievance-like procedure, sometimes ending with a senior corporate executive (Ewing 1990) or 
a joint worker-manager committee (Kaufman, Lewin, and Fossum, 2000). Certain types of NER, 
such as a peer review panel, can be utilized as part of a nonunion “alternative dispute 
resolution” (ADR) system, but often the last step in such systems is some form of arbitration 
(Estreicher, 2004) and here NER often plays little or no role.  
A more complex function, especially in the more highly-developed and formal NER 
systems, is to negotiate for better terms and conditions of work.  Both historically and in 
contemporary practice examples can be found of NER plans that engage in some generic type 
of "collective bargaining," albeit not fully in the trade union manner. At Bethlehem Steel between 
1918 and 1920, minutes of meetings indicated that of the issues raised, 31 percent involved 
wages, 28 percent involved working conditions, 12 percent involved production methods and 10 
percent involved safety (Kaufman, 2000a).  JICs, even in their most contemporary operations in 
21st century Canada, typically have a written constitution and the councils’ activities result in 
formal written contracts that closely resemble collective agreements. At Delta Air Lines, for an 
American example, flight attendant schedules (hours) are a big subject for the Attendant's 
Forum, and the Board Council talks to management about wages and benefits.  Without the 
right to strike, however, the negotiations are confined to the NER’s sophisticated use of 
discussion and persuasion (“collective lobbying”) rather than the overt and formal bargaining 
characteristic of union-management relations. 
An interesting case of NER as a “half-way house” between individual bargaining and 
collective bargaining involves an employee groups recently formed by Wal-Mart workers in 
central Florida. As is well-known, the company strongly resists unionization. Unable to gain 
union representation, the workers formed the Wal-Mart Workers Association and use it to 
provide workplace-related advice and assistance. Although the association stresses it is not a 
labour union, the company has labeled it “a wolf in sheep’s clothing.” (Associated Press, 2005).   
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As indicated in Table 1, NER also plays a number of other functions besides dealing with 
traditional terms and conditions of employment, such as improved production efficiency, morale-
building, and union avoidance. These functions are discussed in more detail later in the paper, 
so we move on.   
(3)  Topics/Subjects: The third dimension of NER is the substantive content of decision-
making.  What are the sets of issues over which NER forums exercise influence?  In addition to 
wages and conditions of work, a wide variety of other subjects are handled by forms of NER, 
listed in Column 3 of Exhibit 1. These subjects vary according to the type of NER. The 
decentralized, small-scale forms of NER typically target only one subject, while larger-scale 
NER may handle a variety. NER forums often discuss the social aspects of work, orientation of 
new employees, the interpretation of handbooks and manuals, and the rectification of various 
irritants at the workplace.  Dental and extended health care plans are reviewed, pension plans 
are examined, and suggestions are made for improvements.  At the Dofasco company in 
Canada, there is an employee group charged with joint oversight of the massive pension plans 
(Harshaw, 2000). Health and safety committees, often mandated by statute in both countries for 
large employers, are a common form of NER at the workplace. 
A particular feature of the US landscape is that the NLRA does not permit discussion of 
the terms and conditions of employment in NER settings, thus seriously circumscribing the 
topics that can be considered.  The most famous legal case in this regard is Electromation, Inc. 
(Devaney 1994; Raudabaugh 2000).  The company had formed joint manager-employee 
“action” committees to recommend improvements in both production and employment 
conditions. The NLRB ruled, however, that by discussing terms and conditions of employment 
the committees had transitioned to “employer-dominated” labour organizations and thus were 
illegal and had to be disbanded. Critics of this ruling charged that it seriously restricted the 
ability of employers to foster employee involvement and participation and implement “high 
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performance” work practices, while proponents argued employers could still pursue these 
matters as long as they were focused on production and quality (Devaney, 1993; Rundle, 1994; 
LeRoy, 2000; Kaufman, Lewin, and Fossum, 2000). The case facts also revealed that, perhaps 
not coincidentally, the action committees appeared at about the same time as the organizers for 
the Teamsters Union.   
In some highly developed plans, the NER forum may be given a broad mandate to 
consider any relevant workplace issue -- even to the point it conflicts with managers’ 
preferences or the shareholder’s financial interests.  For example, to management’s 
consternation a JIC at Imperial Oil in the 1960s invited union organizers into the plant to discuss 
with members the advantages and disadvantages of unionization. Shortly afterward, the plant 
workers voted for union representation. At Delta Air Lines, the employee Board Council is 
exploring the option of hiring an independent legal team to represent the interests of the 
nonunion employees in the bankruptcy proceedings.  
 (4)  Representation Modes:  Worker representatives come to their jobs in a variety of 
ways, and the type of representation often is related to the formality and complexity of the NER 
plan.  Exhibit 1, Column 4, identifies a variety of distinctions that can be used to describe the 
modes of representation.  Often representatives are elected by their constituency group to serve 
a set term in office, usually two years.  At the shopfloor level, the election may involve an 
informal show of hands; in large-size NER plans a secret ballot may be used. In other cases, 
elections are thought to unduly introduce a divisive political aspect and representatives are 
instead selected through an intensive interview process before a joint manager-employee 
committee. In other cases representatives are appointed by management, or chosen by 
management from nominations provided by employees. In this respect, the degree and form of 
democratic practice varies widely -- as it does among unions.  Also paralleling the union case, 
not all workers are anxious to participate, to vote, or to become representatives.  Apathy often is 
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a factor.  
 As most NER is enterprise-based, the representatives come from within the firm’s 
workforce.  Representatives often are employees engaged in similar work to the workers they 
represent.   There also are circumstances in which representatives are external to the firm.  For 
example, professional associations may provide agents or experts to help advance their 
members’ interests in interactions with employers (e.g. in disciplinary hearings or in contract 
negotiations).  External worker advocacy groups, often staffed by lawyers, may provide 
representational services to nonunion workers.  Advocacy groups that deal with the injustices 
faced by immigrants also are active in the NER domain. 
Extent of Power:  The issue of power is one of the most controversial parts of NER. NER 
forms are designed to function largely in a consultative and advisory capacity. One of the 
employer’s goals is to promote greater harmony and cooperation in the workplace, From this 
perspective, all forms of collective bargaining are anathema since they introduce an adversarial 
“we versus them” mentality into employee relations and emphasize “splitting the pie” instead of 
“growing the pie.” For this reason, most forms of NER eschew formal bargaining, forbid 
selection of worker representatives from outside the enterprise, provide no independent 
financial resources or outside professional counsel, and forbid the right to strike.  
Not unexpectedly, for these reasons critics view NER as fatally flawed because it can 
voice workers concerns but has no muscle to make the employer listen and act (Freeman and 
Medoff, 1984; Hiatt and Gold, 2000; Butler, 2004). Critics also allege that NER plans are used to 
co-opt, manipulate, and create “false consciousness” among the workers (Barenberg, 1993).  A 
common charge, for example, is that NER either “wins” for the employees what the company 
had already decided to give, or is used to “sell” or “sugar-coat” give-backs to the company. 
Another line of thought is that companies would never create a NER plan in the first place if it 
did not in the end promote their interests, presumably at the expense of employees’ interests. 
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Given these (alleged) defects, critics of NER often refer to it as a “sham,” a “toothless dog,” and 
a “donkey council” (Dunn, 1926; Basken, 2000). These epithets gain a measure of theoretical 
support from Freeman and Lazear (1995) who demonstrate in a formal model that an employer 
will deliberately restrict the power of a NER below the socially optimal level in order to prevent 
the workers from gaining a larger share of the rents from increased cooperation.    
But another and more positive side to the story also exists. One of the most 
knowledgeable and unbiased observers of NER in the 1920s was economist William Leiserson. 
He (1928: 127) observed “The unskilled and semi-skilled working people of this country, in the 
last six years, have obtained more of the things…. out of employee representation plans than 
they have out of the organized labor movement.”  He (1929: 160) also noted “An examination of 
the grievances adjusted under employee representation plans reveals that the vast majority of 
cases are settled in favor of the workers.” A more recent example concerns Delta Air Lines. 
Immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attack, the major unionized airlines unilaterally laid-off tens of 
thousands of workers; Delta on the other hand worked with the employee Board Council and 
designed a voluntary leave program that avoided layoffs (Kaufman, 2003c). Recent evidence 
from Britain supports these North American examples concerning the efficacy of nonunion voice 
(Bryson, 2004).     
Without the strike threat or independent resources, how can NER nonetheless exert 
power on the employer? The answer is: through several indirect and sometimes subtle 
channels. First, when a company creates NER it raises the expectations of employees that they 
will be consulted and have influence. This expectation creates a form of leverage for workers, 
since if the company reneges then morale plummets and the risk of unionization rises. 
Relatedly, forming a NER body is an invitation to employees to offer their opinions and requests.  
Having asked for employee voice, the company then has to consider that repeatedly saying 
“No” carries its own cost in terms of undercutting the viability of the employee forum and 
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scuttling employee good will.  Another consideration is that NER is created to foster 
cooperaration and mutual gain and “mutual gain” must mean exactly that if it the system is to 
have longevity and effectiveness. NER also exerts indirect bargaining power on employers in 
the sense that they deliberately pay high wages and benefits in order to take distributive issues 
“off the table” so the NER can focus on win-win issues. And, finally, attention should again be 
highlighted on the power NER gains from employers’ desire to avoid unionization. Having said 
all of this, the fact remains that most forms of NER exist at the discretion of employers and have 
influence only to the extent employers see that NER serves their long-term interests.  
(6)  Degree of Permanence.  Finally, in the last column of Exhibit 1, are the temporal 
attributes of NER from the most temporary to the most permanent.  At the top of the chart are  
short-term, ad-hoc types that usually involve consultation about specific topics.   
Joint committees often are at the intermediate stage along this dimension.  They may be 
established and continue to operate until a defined problem is fixed or a target is reached.  
There also are committees that are given a time target at their inception, e.g. one year to draft a 
joint approach to anti-harassment policies.   
Permanent NER structures exist within companies as well-integrated features of a larger 
human resource management philosophy of involving workers.  Outside the workplace, the 
permanent NER forums usually represent professionals or are advocacy and lobby groups.  The 
noteworthy exception is that government policy mandates (in certain industries, provinces or 
states) the existence and continuation of health and safety committees.   
 
THE FOUR FACES OF NER 
Nonunion employee representation is one of the most controversial topics in industrial 
relations research and policy. Part of the reason is that NER is a tangled skein consisting of 
many different threads of values and perspectives.  In this regard, Freeman and Medoff (1984) 
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famously noted that trade unions have two different “faces” and the conclusions one reaches 
about unions hinge critically on which face is examined. We advance the same proposition 
about NER, but posit that NER has four faces. The purpose of these “four faces” is to 
systematize and distinguish some of the diverse perspectives previously noted, particularly 
regarding the purpose and effects of NER.  
These four faces of NER are summarized in Exhibit 2.  They represent different 
dimensions or “realities” of NER.  For each face we (1) describe its premises, (2) recount a 
snippet of North American history that undergirds it, and (3) provide an evaluation of the 
arguments for and against. Although these four faces are presented here as separate entities, in 
real life they frequently commingle.  
<INSERT EXHIBIT 2 HERE> 
 1. Evolutionary Voice Face.   
Premise:  One perspective on NER is that it provides a waystation or “mid-point” in the 
development of employee voice and industrial democracy (Bernstein, 1960; Ozanne, 1967; 
Brody, 1994). In this view, the industrial relations landscape is conceptualized as a continuum. 
At the starting point is a regime of individual bargaining, employer unilateralism, and absence of 
any mechanism for employee voice and representation. This is the traditional workplace that 
characterized early 20th century capitalism.  
Then, as society evolves, employees and the public demand a more humanized and 
democratic form of workforce governance. One vehicle for voice and industrial democracy is 
collective bargaining and independent trade unionism, but the dominant political and business 
elites strenuously oppose it. Needing to find some compromise and safety valve for employee 
aspirations and discontent, employers and governments search for an alternative  voice 
mechanism that placates workers yet preserves the profits and control of capital. One of the 
alternatives they innovate is employer-created NER.  
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Although perhaps marginally effective, NER does not, in this view, alter the basic 
imbalance in power and control exercised by capital over labour. Hence, workers grow 
dissatisfied with NER and come to see it as a largely empty promise. But NER has provided one 
important benefit – it has given workers important experience in collective action and whetted 
their desire for genuine voice (Bernstein, 1960; Derber, 1970). As a result, workers seek to 
move further along the continuum of voice, in this case from the NER mid-point to the end point 
of independent trade unionism and collective bargaining (not revolution, as prophesized by 
Lenin). As they do so, NER is displaced and its phony form of industrial democracy is 
supplanted by genuine industrial democracy (Gitelman, 1988).  
History:  To many observers, the trajectory of North American industrial relations from 1900 to 
the 1970s traced-out this face of NER. The early part of the 20th century was the era of 
employer autocracy. Then Canada and the US moved into the Welfare Capitalism and NER 
phase of the 1910s and 1920s, representing a partial movement along the voice and industrial 
democracy continuum. But these forms of industrial relations, it is argued, were inherently 
unbalanced and ineffective and collapsed under the weight of the Great Depression and worker 
rebellion (Gilson, 1940; Bernstein, 1960; Cohen, 1990). Born in the 1930s was industrial 
unionism on a mass scale, leading to the near-disappearance of NER. As trade unionism 
spread and consolidated in the 1950s-1970s, it appeared that Canada and the US were arriving 
at the end point on the continuum of industrial democracy. To the consternation of proponents 
of the evolutionary voice face, however, the visible erosion of union density in the last two 
decades of the century represented an unwelcome and unexpected retrogression toward 
unilateral employer control and empty forms of employee voice. They point the finger of blame 
at hostile employers, union-busting consultants, weak labour laws, lax regulatory enforcement, 
and the ill effects of globalization and de-industrialization (Freidman, Hurd, Oswald, and Seeber, 
1994; Logan, 2002).  
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Evaluation:  The basic proposition behind the evolutionary voice face is that NER is an unstable 
form of voice and ultimately serves as a springboard to unionism.  Evidence both pro and con 
exists on this point.   
Both historical and contemporary evidence suggests that NER can be a waystation (or 
“launching pad”) to unionism. The literature for Canada is reviewed in Taras and Copping (1997: 
27) and Timur (2004) presents three detailed case studies showing how unions successfully 
used NER plans to gain collective bargaining rights. In the US, NER plans in the steel, energy, 
and telecommunications sectors were “captured” by union militants in the 1930s and used to 
usher in collective bargaining (Brody 1960; Bernstein, 1960;  Ozanne, 1967; Schacht, 1975; 
Hogler and Grenier 1992).  The same experience is reported in Canada.  According to Basken 
(2000), one-third of the energy sector members in the Canadian-based Communication, Energy, 
and Paperworkers Union were recruited from NER plans.  
Other evidence is less supportive. The American Federation of Labor (AFL) initially 
supported the US government’s mandate that major corporations establish shop committees 
during World War I on the presumption that they would quickly transition to independent trade 
unions. The AFL soon concluded, however, that shop committees were more formidable voice 
mechanisms than anticipated, leading it to reverse course and condemn shop committees as a 
“a delusion and snare” (AFL, 1919: 303; Nelson, 2000). Likewise, the “company unions” created 
by leading American and Canadian employers in the 1920s received quite favorable reviews 
from outside observers (Leiserson, 1929; Nelson, 2000; Kaufman, 2000b) and showed little sign 
of implosion. In the view of NER proponents, the triumph of independent unionism over NER in 
the 1930s and 1940s was less the product of an inevitable transition to “genuine” industrial 
democracy and more the result of the calamity of the Great Depression, the desperate need of 
the governments for labour peace during World War II, the pro-union labour policies of the 
American New Deal, and the opportunistic political maneuverings of the organized labour 
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movement (Hicks, 1941). Finally, the fact that union density has steadily declined in recent 
decades suggests, in this view, that many workers do not regard unions as the ideal form of 
industrial democracy and, indeed, often prefer some type of NER. This latter supposition is 
supported by the research of Freeman and Rogers (1999) that finds a majority of American 
workers prefer a cooperative joint committee form of voice over a more powerful but adversarial 
independent union.   
2. Unity of Interest   
Premise:  It is employers that most often create NER and from their perspective it has a second 
face. Employers look at NER as a component of their human resource management (HRM) 
system and utilize it to the extent it, like other HRM practices, adds to profit and competitive 
advantage. NER adds to profit through a variety of channels, such as improved information and 
communication, better coordination of production, and increased employee morale.  According 
to many managers who practice NER, the ultimate objective is the promotion of greater 
cooperation and unity of interest in the workplace (e.g., Basset 1919, Fuldner, 2000; Kaufman 
2003b).  
Organizations are more effective, in the management view, when workers and managers 
work together as an effective team. Teamwork, in turn, is facilitated when managers and 
workers share a common purpose and reap win-win rewards. Employers are opposed to unions 
because they foster an adversarial “win-lose” mentality in the workplace and promote conflict 
and divisive organizational politics. The purpose of NER is the opposite. Employers create NER 
to foster greater cooperation and unity of interest by reducing frictions, promoting employee 
involvement and empowerment, and providing a forum for workers and managers to construct 
mutual gain outcomes. To the degree NER is successful at this task, a beneficial by-product 
from the management perspective is that workers lose interest in union representation. 
Companies view this outcome as a benign form of “union substitution” constructed from superior 
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treatment and excellent management.  
History:  The idea that management can gain competitive advantage by shifting the employment 
relationship from a zero-sum adversarial struggle to a positive-sum cooperative endeavor was 
articulated in a comprehensive way for the first time in the industrial relations literature by John 
Commons in his book Industrial Goodwill (1919). This proposition was widely repeated in North 
American management circles in the 1920s and provided the raison d’etre for the development 
of the Welfare Capitalist model. According to one observer (Leiserson, 1929), the “crown jewel” 
of this new management model was the employee representation plan. The stated purpose of 
NER, in turn, was to achieve cooperation and unity of interest. Thus, an early survey of NER in 
North America concluded (NICB, 1922: 53) “the ultimate objective of employee representation 
may be regarded as the achievement of cooperation between management and men – 
substitution of cooperation for antagonism.” In a similar vein, Clarence Hicks (1941) – arguably 
the most prominent and influential proponent of NER among practicing industrial relations 
executives of that period – stated “To the extent that American employers recognize the 
common interests of management and men and invite their employees to co-operate with them 
through representatives of their own choosing, to that extent American industry will pass from 
the stage of autocracy and its counterpart, antagonism, to one of friendly co-operation.”  
The Welfare Capitalist model died or went into deep background in the Great 
Depression years (Jacoby, 1997; Moriguchi, 2005) and with it went the unitarist management 
model and positive conception of NER, replaced with the pluralist model of independent 
unionism and collective bargaining. Starting in the 1960s and 1970s, the unitarist model started 
to make a comeback, albeit repackaged as human resource management (HRM) and the high 
performance work system (HPWS). Beer and Spector (1984), for example, list sixteen principles 
that distinguish the HRM/HPWS model. Principle #6 is: “In the long-run there is a coincidence of 
interests between employees, management, and shareholders.” Kochan and Osterman (1994) 
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develop the same idea but call it the “mutual gain” model. Key to the HPWS is some formal 
system for employee involvement (Appelbaum et al 2000; Cappelli and Neumark, 2001). 
Indeed, so central is employee involvement (EI) that Lawler (1992) and others prefer to call the 
HPWS the “high involvement” model. As remarked on earlier in this paper, and developed at 
more length in Taras (2003), the modern literature on employee involvement and the HPWS 
largely omits explicit consideration of whether EI is delivered through direct or indirect (NER) 
forms of participation. But as documented by Kaufman, Lewin, and Fossum (2000) and Verma 
(2000), some form of NER is in fact found in a number of HPWS organizations in both the US 
and Canada. Further, employer groups in the US lobbied extensively in the mid-1990s for 
passage of legislation known as “The Team Act” that would relax the company union ban in the 
NLRA, citing the argument that the ban seriously restricted the ability of companies to 
implement the unitarist HPWS model (LeRoy 1997). (President Clinton vetoed the legislation 
and no new impetus for passage has emerged under President Bush.)     
Evaluation: Evidence both pro and con can be marshalled on the unity of interest face of NER. 
For example, a number of labour historians (e.g., Gitelman, 1988; Rees, 1997) dismiss the 
Welfare Capitalist movement of the 1920s as a failed experiment that accomplished little. 
Similarly, critics of employee representation (e.g., Ozanne, 1967; Basken, 2000; Hiatt and Gold 
2000) argue that the main purpose of NER is something quite different – union avoidance 
(discussed next) -- and the real meaning of  “unity of interest” is “cooperate on our terms.” Other 
critics/skeptics admit that unity of interest may be a genuine management goal, but conclude 
that few companies can successfully create and maintain unity of interest over the longer run 
(Hammer, 2000). In support of this assertion, they point to the short half-life of many NER/EI 
systems and the documented cases where they are innocuous window-dressing (“kiss me” 
clubs) or the “fad of the day” (Gilson, 1940; Gilpin, 1992; Brody, 1994; Commission on the 
Future of Worker-Management Relations, 1994).  
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 But there is also strong evidence on the other side. Sumner Slichter (1929: 432) called 
the new unitarist labour practices of the Welfare Capitalist model “one of the most ambitious 
social experiments of the age” and Leiserson (1929: 164) surveyed the results of Welfare 
Capitalism for employer-employee relations and concluded it was “an impressive sum.”  The 
contention that Welfare Capitalism and NER were more than innocuous window-dressing is 
supported by the fact that during the 1930s and 1940s AFL and CIO unions were largely unable 
to organize plants of the leading practitioners of Welfare Capitalism (e.g., Standard Oil, DuPont) 
despite numerous attempts (Chase, 1947).  Recent research (e.g., Fairrris, 1997; Pencavel, 
2003) also provides econometric evidence that companies with NER plans paid higher wages 
and had lower turnover and higher productivity. 
Similar but more recent evidence comes from Canada. The JIC at Imperial Oil is now in 
its eighth decade of operation and has at most production facilities withstood union organizing 
campaigns. Likewise, the Dofasco company, one of Canada’s two largest steel producers, has 
operated a large-scale NER system for a half-century (Storey 1987). That workers can be quite 
satisfied with NER is also suggested by Rundle (1998) who documents that unions won 48 
percent of NLRB elections in the US when the company had no EI program but only 30 percent 
when an EI program was present. Finally, one notes that the HPWS model has spread in 
popularity and adoption over the last three decades in both the US and Canada, suggesting that 
the unitarist concept is not simply a pipe dream of management consultants and writers. 
Further, the component of the HPWS that has gained the most attention is employee 
involvement and participation; indeed, some management writers equate a strategic approach 
to HRM with high-level employee involvement (McMahan, Bell, and Virick, 1998). Evidently, 
then, the role of NER as a leading-edge management practice and vehicle for greater 
cooperation and efficiency in the workplace continues to have relevance.      
3.  Union Avoidance.  
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Premise:  This face posits that the primary purpose of NER plans is union avoidance.  From this 
perspective, employers in North America have a deep hostility toward unions, reflecting in part 
the North American ethos of individualism and sacrosanct private property rights but equally or 
more so the threat that unions pose toward employers’ profits and control in a decentralized 
bargaining system. Unions provide workers with collective power that allows them to raise 
wages, increase benefits, and gain job security. Likewise, unions democractize the workplace, 
replacing employer autocracy and arbitrariness with joint governance, written procedures, and 
due process in discipline and discharge (Derber, 1970).  
To escape the yoke of unionism, employers use both the “carrot and stick” to dissuade 
workers from organizing (Lawler, 1990). NER plays a central role in both approaches and is why 
trade unionists hate it. A Canadian union leader (Basken, 2000: 491) says “There are no 
benefits to company unions. They just keep the trade union movement figures lower,” while the 
American AFL-CIO observes “the ultimate goal [of NER] is... to stifle legitimate worker voice and 
to stave off genuine worker organization” (AFL-CIO Press Release 22 Feb. 1995, p. 1).  
The “carrot” approach of union avoidance is what we earlier referred to as union 
substitution. Its objective is to buy-off the workers by giving them more than the union can in the 
form of superior wages, better conditions, and some mechanism for voice and dispute 
resolution. The latter is often implemented through NER. The union substitution philosophy is 
well illustrated in the observation of Gibb and Knowlton (1956: 585), referring to Standard Oil’s 
newly inaugurated Welfare Capitalist program, that “There was a ready, if unspoken 
appreciation of the fact that the new plans and practices were suffocating by sheer weight of 
generosity the forces of unionism within the company.” [Note that generosity and unity of 
interest are potentially two different things.] A similar strategy is used by modern practitioners of 
NER. Taras (2000) describes, for example, how Imperial Oil pays industry-leading wages and 
benefits in the Canadian petro-chemical industry, while Kaufman (2003) notes that Delta Air 
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Lines uses the same strategy in the US.  
Critics of NER argue that the workers’ gains in a union substitution situation are at best 
temporary and at worst manipulative and delusional. But the case against NER is much 
stronger, they argue, because often it is used to fend-off unionism as part of companies’ overt or 
covert “stick” strategy of union suppression (Dunn, 1926; Gitelman, 1988). Union suppression 
keeps out unions by negative methods that rely on fear, coercion, and punishment, such as 
harassment and discharge of union activists, infiltrating the workforce with spies, and spreading 
rumors and disinformation about unions and their supporters. NER plans, the critics contend, 
play an important role in this strategy, per Senator Wagner’s comment that “At the present time 
genuine collective bargaining is being thwarted immeasurably by the proliferation of company 
unions” (National Labor Relations Board, 1985: 23).  
Proponents of this view point out, for example, that frequently employers only implement 
some form of NER when a crisis hits, and usually the crisis is the threat of unionization. The 
quotation by Senator Wagner was in the context of the mushroom growth of company unions in 
1933-1935 that was precipitated by the spread of union organizing activity and the 
Government’s encouragement of collective bargaining. The role of NER in this situation is 
several-fold. First, establishment of NER is intended to signal the workers that the employer will 
listen to them and redress their dissatisfactions, hopefully taking some of the steam out of the 
union drive. Second, by at least temporarily forestalling unionization a NER plan can also buy 
management additional time so it can better map-out a strategy to thwart the union, discover 
who the union activists are, and bring in union-busting consultants. And, finally, employers use 
NER to reward loyal employees, distribute pro-company propaganda, and pass on to 
management the names of trouble-makers. When the threat of unionization goes away, so does 
the employer’s interest in NER.      
History: Examination of the historical record reveals a strong correlation between union activity 
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and employer interest in NER. The “granddaddy” of NER plans set-up by Rockefeller and King 
at the Colorado Fuel and Iron Co. in 1915 was a direct outgrowth of the company’s bitter 
struggle to keep out the United Mine Workers union. The huge spike in the formation of shop 
councils and JICs in both the World War I period and the early New Deal period was also 
closely associated with a much-increased union threat. The number of companies with 
representation plans slowly declined in the 1920s in the US in lockstep with the decline in union 
density, but then more than doubled in only two years (1933-1935) when union organizing 
rebounded. Further, critics of NER in this period recounted numerous stories about companies 
discharging NER representatives who challenged management’s position and forming NERs to 
break strikes. A well-known example before World War II was the Weirton Steel Company. It 
fired union activists, rejected the government’s request to hold a representation election, and 
instead formed a company union (Bernstein, 1970).  
One finds similar evidence in recent times. In a review of recent Canadian case law on 
nonunion representation, Taras (2006) finds many cases where the company scrambled to 
create a nonunion forum in reaction to a union drive. Further, she notes numerous allegations of 
a variety of unfair labour practices, including discrimination against union organizers, making 
threats of job loss or plant closure, and failing to bargain in good faith. The American case law 
reveals a similar pattern, Rundle (1994), for example, examined fifty-eight Sec. 8a2 cases 
where the NLRB ordered a NER plan disestablished and found that in only two  was there 
neither a union organizing campaign underway nor commission of one or more other unfair 
labour practices by the employer.     
Evaluation: Only a sophist would deny that union avoidance is a major purpose of NER. 
The empirical record is full of evidence from both Canada and the US that employer interest in 
and commitment to NER is strongly influenced by their desire to remain union-free. This 
conclusion is the easy part. But it is not the entire story, and it is more difficult to evaluate the 
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extent to which the union avoidance aim of NER is socially pernicious. 
 One appears to over-reach, for example, to claim that union avoidance is the sole or 
perhaps even primary motive behind all NER. In the 1920s most of the companies adopting 
NER were in the progressive vanguard of employers and faced a very small union threat 
(Nelson, 2000). Yet they invested large sums and money and management attention in creating 
employee representation plans. A similar pattern is evident today where EI programs and other 
HPWS practices are clustered in companies often held-out as model employers (Lawler, 1992; 
Kochan and Osterman, 1994).  
Further, where union avoidance takes place as a union substitution program, it seems 
difficult to condemn the improved wages, conditions, and voice that result. Speaking in the late 
1920s, Lesierson (1929: 146-7) took this position, commenting: “The weakening of trade 
unionism that has resulted [from NERs and Welfare Capitalism] is an undesirable consequence, 
but who will say then that we should go back to the days when management neglected its social 
responsibilities toward its employees. The labor movement….if it is weakened by the activities 
of personnel management…. needs to look to its larger program.” One must also note that 
although NER has numerous shortcomings, so too do many unions – a fact sometimes unduly 
neglected by NER critics. 
 On the other hand, when union avoidance takes the form of union suppression then 
most people would readily agree that NER is being used in an anti-social way. Certainly this is 
the case when NER is utilized in an unethical or illegal manner to thwart the legitimate rights of 
workers to collective bargain. It is on these grounds that critics of NER oppose further 
legalization or encouragement of NER. Hiatt and Gold (2000: 510) state, for example, “when 
workers are unlawfully fired with virtual impunity in one of every four union organizing 
campaigns, it would be foolish to erect, or resurrect, another obstacle to workers seeking to 
improve their lot.”  
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Few proponents of NER would argue with the position that the law should be observed 
and illegalities punished. Given this, many proponents also claim that the union side 
exaggerates the incidence of illegalities and, further, seeks to restrict NER largely because 
organized labour does not want competition in the supply of employee voice. Raudabaugh 
(2000: 516) argues, for example, that “Restricting or prohibiting such [NER] programs amounts 
to nothing more than shoring up the union option at the expense of employee free choice.”  
The position we have taken on this subject is a compromise (Kaufman and Taras, 2000): allow 
workers to freely choose no union, a company-created NER plan, or independent union 
representation, but ensure that the right of workers to choose independent representation is 
strongly protected. Not only do we believe that freedom of association is a basic human right 
and should be fully protected (with stronger and more effective legislation and procedures than 
currently exist in the US) but also that a potent union threat is one of the forces that motivates 
employers to operate NER in an above-board and vital manner.    
4.  Complementary Voice 
Premise:  The fourth face looks at NER as a complement to trade unionism, not a substitute as 
in the second and third face. In this view, NER and trade unionism largely occupy separate 
domains and serve different goals and functions. This being the case, it is not a matter of “one 
or the other” but how best to “mix and match” the two into a composite system of voice.   
 The “complementary” viewpoint was expressed early-on by both Paul Douglas (1921) 
and Henry Seager (1923). Douglas states, for example, “Modern industry needs both the shop 
committee and the trades union, since both are necessary for the effective carrying out of the 
relationship between workmen and employer….The unions have hitherto have been chiefly 
combative organizations designed to protect and enhance the workmen’s share in distribution. 
This is still a necessary function,… The co-operative features of the relationship between 
employer and employee however, need to be developed equally.… and in performing this 
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function the shop committee is invaluable” (p. 107). In a similar vein, Seager observes, 
“Company unions are better calculated than trade unions to promote continuity, economy, and 
efficiency of operation” but that trade unions are needed “to contend against the grasping type 
of employer for more favorable wages, hours, or working conditions” (p. 11).   
More recently, the idea of complementarity has been widely discussed with respect to 
European works councils. It is commonly observed, for example, that the works council handles 
local plant level issues through joint consultation and the trade union takes cares of industry-
wide matters such as wages and hours through collective bargaining (Rogers and Streeck, 
1995; Frege, 2002). In the Canadian context, Taras (1997b) has described how the mix of 
unions and NER has stabilized the wage structure and system of employee relations in the 
petroleum industry.   
History: The historical record appears to reveal two lessons about the complementary face of 
North American NER.  
The first is that the complementary face does indeed exist. In the 1920s there were 
cases where a plant or company had a joint system of governance with both a works council 
and trade union (National Industrial Conference Board, 1922). Similarly, then and now some 
companies have collective bargaining for one part of the workforce (e.g., production workers) 
and NER for another part (office and management workers).  A modern-day illustration in the 
US is FedEx Corporation (Kaufman, Lewin, and Fossum, 2000). Also apropos are two other 
examples.  The first is found within companies where collective bargaining and NER overlap 
and serve the same group of employees. A case identified by Helfgott ( 2000) is unionized 
companies that also have identity groups for employees of different gender/race/sexual 
orientations.  
Chaykowski’s (2000) study of the National Joint Council system in Canada (a post-World 
War II nonunion variant of the British Whitley plan for government employees) provides a 
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second illustration. Originally Canadian civil servants were deprived of the right to unionise and 
instead developed elaborate systems of nonunion representation.  When finally in the 1960s 
they were granted the right to organize, and rapidly did so, the NJC was maintained.  Although 
the natural tendency might be to view the NJC and the burgeoning public sector unions as 
competitors, Chaykowski’s surprising conclusion was that over time the two systems developed 
a productive synergy.  
The second lesson of history appears to be that the complementary face of NER is 
destined to be low-incidence and unstable, at least absent legislative compulsion. Unions are 
highly skeptical of all NER forms, viewing them as not only competitors but latent threats to their 
very existence. Likewise, employers stoutly resist unions and will get rid of them whenever 
practical. Thus, the marriage of the two representational forms tends to be rare and short-lived. 
The exception appears to be when legislation, such as in Europe, mandates a peaceful 
coexistence between the two.      
Evaluation:  The complementary face of NER highlights a theme from the earlier part of this 
paper: namely, that there is much diversity in form and function of employee representation. In 
this regard, most commentators accept that both NER and trade unions have their strengths 
and weaknesses and both have a useful if necessarily delimited role to play in the workplace. 
This position was taken by Senator Wagner, for example, who stated that NER plans often 
improve plant operations and promote greater cooperation between managers and workers, 
while trade unions are necessary to take wages and other labour costs out of competition at the 
market level and give workers voice in the national polity (Kaufman, 2000a,b).  The challenge is 
to craft a legislative framework that promotes the optimal mix of the two forms of voice, 
particularly when the need for and virtues of the two forms of voice vary so much across firms, 
industries, time periods, and macroeconomic environments (Sims, 2000). But this consideration 
leads to the next section.   
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NER’S UNCERTAIN FUTURE 
The future of NER in North America is uncertain, reflecting the diverse and changeable nature 
of the benefits and costs of NER and the present – but unlikely -- possibility of new legislation in 
one or both countries. Also making prognostication difficult is that NER, as earlier argued, is not 
a monolithic creature but one encompassing a tremendously variegated set of institutions and 
functions.  
 It is interesting to observe, firstly, that evidence suggests there is a roughly similar level 
of NER across major industrial countries, even in the face of large differences in union density, 
legal frameworks, and so on. For example, Lloyd (2001: 314) estimates that just under one-fifth 
of UK workplaces (with 25 or more employees) have a consultative nonunion employee 
representation committee (also see Terry, 1999; Gollan, 2000). Likewise, Addison, Schnabel, 
and Wagner (2000) estimate that roughly 20 percent of German firms have a works council 
(covering, however, three-fourths of employees), while in Japan joint consultation committees 
are found in approximately 30 percent of nonunion firms (Morishima and Tsuru 2000). And, as 
we earlier noted, survey evidence provided by Lipset and Meltz (2004) suggests that (roughly) 
15-20 percent of workers in Canada and the US are covered by NER. Admittedly these 
numbers have significant variance, but on the other hand they are surprisingly similar given the 
very large differences in the institutional frameworks of these countries and their cultural/social 
histories. One can conclude from this evidence that NER has found a relatively stable if fairly 
modest-sized domain in the employment relations system of numerous countries. Certainly the 
fact that NER has a more-or-less similar density in the US and Canada (if the data are indeed 
accurate), even though trade union density and the legal treatment of NER are so different, is 
noteworthy. 
 These statistics suggest that perhaps there is an “equilibrium” level of NER in the range 
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of 15-30 percent of firms. If so, the trend of NER in Canada and the US may be relatively stable 
in the years ahead. But this equilibrium (if such exists) is itself a product of a constellation of 
individual decisions by employers and workers, presumably made on the basis of various 
benefits and costs. As these benefits and costs change over time, as surely they will, the 
observed level of NER will also change.  
 This paper is not the place for a full-blown consideration of this topic. So we will content 
ourselves with a few short observations.  
First, evidence suggests that the incidence of large-size formal NER plans of the JIC 
type will remain relatively small – even if the US law were changed to give employers freedom 
of choice in this matter. Employers already have this freedom of choice in Canada, for example, 
and yet relatively few private sector Canadian employers use a JIC form of NER (Taras, 2000a; 
Verma, 2000). Anecdotal evidence provided in Kaufman, Lewin, and Fossum (2000) suggests 
the reason is that many employers regard a JIC as too cumbersome, expensive, and a “one 
size fits all” approach. Further, the emphasis in management circles in recent years has been 
on reducing fixed costs and increasing organizational flexibility and nimbleness – objectives that 
militate against a JIC and similar company-wide forms of NER. Taras (2000a,b) suggests 
several other cogent reasons. She points out, for example, that companies running JIC plans 
typically pay wages and benefits as high or higher than the union level, thus mitigating any 
direct labour cost saving, while successful operation of a JIC requires a tremendous amount of 
management time and sophistication (also see Grant 1988 and Kaufman, 2003c). Finally, 
employers fear that a JIC can easily turn into a labour union. As one manager told Taras many 
years ago, nonunion plans are “pet bears” because they require their “trainer” to keep sweets in 
his pockets and never turn his back for an instant.  
Having said all of this, we also believe that a small number of companies will continue to 
find some form of company-wide NER an attractive HRM practice, if perhaps not in the mold of 
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the 1920s representation plans. Certainly were the NLRA to be liberalized in the US, we would 
expect some companies to go down this path, just as have some companies that fall outside 
coverage of the NLRA (Delta Air Lines) and as others did until forced to disband their NERs by 
the NLRB (e.g., Donnelly, Polaroid).  
A second speculation is that in the years ahead there may well be a growth in the use of 
smaller-scale, more decentralized and focused forms of NER. As the traditional “command and 
control” model of management and multi-tiered hierarchial business organization is displaced by 
models of “lean production” and “high commitment” with much-reduced layers of management, 
small-to-medium scale NER has a greater role to play and should grow in popularity. Thus, as 
Taras (2003) notes, while the labels and specific practices have changed as we transition from 
employee representation to employee involvement, at the core level they both involve some 
form of indirect representation, or what we have called NER. Recognizing that management 
often talks a better game than it plays in EI and other such “high performance” practices, we 
nonetheless believe that EI will grow in the future as will the need for NER to deliver it.  
A similar thought applies to other forms of NER, such as peer review panels and other 
joint forums for dispute resolution. Numerous Canadian and American firms have moved toward 
greater use of ADR techniques, partly to avoid costly court suits, and often set-up some kind of 
in-house dispute resolution panel or committee (Colvin, 2004; Lewin, 2005. Again, here is a 
greater role for NER. Also present, we note, is the same age-old controversy that accompanies 
NER – whether employers “stack the deck” in their favor when they set-up their in-house 
arbitration and mediation systems, just as was alleged with the employee representation plans 
of the 1920s. 
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To adequately study the NER phenomenon we need the national surveys and intensive 
fieldwork studies provided by Canadian and American governments earlier in the last century.   
With such data, the first step would be to provide an accurate description of NER, along the six 
constructs presented in Exhibit 1. Next would come more modeling of NER and ability to 
rigorously test many of the hypotheses discussed here about the four faces of NER and NER’s 
many alleged and controversial benefits and costs.  
In this essay we have sought to highlight the diversity and many faces of NER. Too often 
scholarly discussion of this subject in North America equates NER with “company union.” 
Nonunion employee representation is, in fact, highly variegated in form, function and purpose 
and ranges all the way from a one person ombud to a corporate level employee committee 
reporting to the Board of Directors. Even the early company unions, on deeper examination, 
were tremendously diverse in terms of their operation and accomplishments. Modern scholars 
thus need to take to heart William Leiserson’s (1928) astute observation that “almost anything 
that may be said about employee representation will be true.”  
Though widespread, we believe that absent any public policy advances that promote it, 
NER will remain a firmly established but modest-sized phenomenon with some growth in small-
scale NER practices but little growth in complex NER plans.  At the present time we see no 
groundswell of demand in either Canada or the US for different legislative treatment of NER. 
Although efforts to loosen the company union ban in the NLRA rose to the top of the policy 
agenda in the Clinton years, currently reform of the NLRA seems like a dead issue with neither 
employers, unions, nor the Bush administration interested in it. To we and some other industrial 
relations scholars, this seems like serious lacuna and missed opportunity, given the significant-
sized participation/representation gap Freeman and Rogers (1999) found in the American 
workplace. Surely NER could play a constructive role in closing this gap, particularly since the 
majority of workers reported they wanted an intermediate form of voice between the “open door” 
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and an independent union. But the broader body of North American IR scholars have 
themselves been deeply suspicious of NER, as evidenced by the very timid and lukewarm 
treatment given to NER by the Dunlop Commission, so not even pressure for change emanates 
from this source. And cynics -- or perhaps realists -- would note that American companies seem 
quite adept at beating back unions with the existing armory of weapons they have, so it is small 
wonder that employer support for greater NER is modest-to-negligible. It appears, therefore, 
that NER in North America is caught in conflicting pressures in both the real world and 
academic world.  
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Exhibit 1:  Examples of Diversity of NER Plans 
1.  Forms 2.  Functions 3.  Topics 4.  Representation 
Modes  
5.  Extent of Power 6.  Degree of 
Permanence 
Ombud  
Joint Safety Committee 
Dispute Resolution Panel 
Scanlon Plan & Gain-Sharing 
committee 
Departmental Production & 
Coordination Committee 
Quality Improvement 
Committee 
Gender/Ethnic/Sex Identity 
Groups 
Employee-Management 
Advisory Committees 
Cross-Divisional Council for 
Employment Issues 
Plant Council   
Employee Committee on Board 
of Directors 
Company-Wide Representation 
Systems, such as JICs 
Staff Associations 
Professional Advocacy Groups  
Communication & 
Information Flow  
Production and 
Organizational 
Coordination 
Employee Morale & Esprit 
de Corps 
Education and Training of 
Employees 
Employee Relations and 
Disposition of Irritants 
Employee Involvement 
Corporate Culture 
Cooperation & Common 
Purpose 
Management & Employee 
Development 
“Trojan Horse” for Union 
Organizing 
Union Substitution 
Union Avoidance 
Lobbying Government 
 
Benefits, including Pensions 
and Health Insurance 
Safety/Health 
Working Conditions 
Grievances/Dispute 
Resolution 
Management Problems 
Employee Relations Climate 
Production Issues 
Equipment/Capital Issues 
Customer Service 
Quality of Products and 
Production 
Business Strategy  
Wages and other Terms and 
Conditions of 
Employment 
Status of the Occupation 
 
 
Internal to the Firm (e.g., elected 
representative from among 
workers in the group) 
External to the Firm (e.g., players’ 
agents in sports) 
Representatives Appointed by 
Management 
Representatives Elected by 
Workers (secret ballot) 
Degree of 
Independence of Representation 
(e.g., budget and resources; 
reporting relationships; ability to 
meet independently from 
managers, etc.) 
Ability to seek 
professional expertise outside the 
firm (e.g., lawyers, actuaries, etc.) 
 
Completely Co-opted by 
Management 
Scope of Power (e.g. single topic 
or broad authority) 
Informal Consultation  
Advisory Groups 
Decisions made by Consensus 
only 
“Dealing With” Management 
through Preparation of Formal 
Positions 
Chairing or Co-chairing meetings 
Developing the Agenda 
Negotiating 
Distribution of minutes and 
positions 
Ability to Take Action to Promote 
Positions 
Vote-Taking in NER; majority 
wins 
Worker Veto Power over Change 
 
Short-term, Ad Hoc 
Committee 
Time-limited, until a Problem 
     is Solved 
Disbandable Structure upon 
Notice by One or the 
other Party 
Permanent Structure 
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Exhibit 2:  Four Faces of NER 
 Evolutionary Unity of Interest Union Avoidance Complementary 
Purpose Gradual improvement 
of labour’s economic 
position and 
democratizing of the 
workplace 
Create a harmonious 
workplace in which 
workers are aligned 
with drivers of firm 
success 
To suppress demand 
for unions through 
union suppression and 
union substitution 
tactics.  
Beneficial interaction of the 
unique competencies of unions 
and nonunion systems 
Paradigm History, Institutional 
(Evolutionary) 
Economics, pluralist 
Industrial Relations  
Unitarist Human 
Resource 
Management, 
Organizational 
Development 
Traditional IR for Union 
Suppression, 
paternalist/unitarist 
HRM for union 
substitution. 
Combination of IR and HRM 
Utility to 
Firm 
Economies of scale in 
dealing with workers in 
groups; achieving 
better systems of voice 
among workers; 
superior worker-
manager 
communication vehicle 
Alignment of workers 
to firm’s goals, foster 
cooperation, reduce 
adversarialism, 
improved 
communication 
Early-warning system 
to detect employee 
discontent and union 
organizing, reduces 
employees’ desire for 
union representation, 
vehicle for weeding out 
union activists and 
buying time to defeat 
the union drive.  
Captures advantages of unions 
(e.g. standardized wages and 
benefits, taking wages out of 
competition) and advantages of 
nonunion representation in 
internal workforce governance 
(e.g. non-adversarial form of 
collective voice) 
Utility to 
Workers 
Gradual expansion of 
wages and benefits, 
greater voice and due 
process, substitutes 
independence for 
paternalism and 
autocracy. 
Greater voice and 
influence in firm, 
direct access to 
management, higher 
morale, improved 
pay and benefits. 
Company may raise 
wages and benefits 
and improve conditions 
to keep out union, 
workers may be so 
alienated by hard-ball 
tactics that it builds 
more support for the 
union.  
Workers may get the best of both 
systems; Workers get benefits of 
unionization without paying dues, 
while turning attention to other 
workplace issues 
Utility to 
Unions 
Worker demand for 
unions gradually 
increases, union 
density rises over time.  
If nonunion system 
not managed well, 
may lead dissatisfied 
workers to unionize. 
 
The firm may over-do 
firings and repression, 
leading to “backfire” 
effect in which 
employees have a 
greater demand for 
union representation.   
Positive: Unions retain their  
contribution as negotiators of 
terms and conditions of 
employment, making union 
organizing attractive 
Negative: Free-riding by workers 
makes unionization difficult 
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 Evolutionary Unity of Interest Union Avoidance Complementary 
Examples 
of 
Worksite 
Practices 
Evolution of dispute 
resolution from “open 
door” to formal 
grievance system, 
replacement of informal 
and subjective HRM 
practices for written 
and formal procedures. 
Joint committee on 
gain-sharing, peer 
review dispute 
resolution panel, 
employee 
representatives on 
board of directors. 
 
Union substitution uses 
many high performance 
HRM practices, union 
suppression relies on 
heavy use of external 
consultants and 
attorneys, frequent 
terminations. 
Collective bargaining of 
economic package, use of joint 
worker-management committees 
on working conditions, quality of 
worklife.   
 
 
 
 
 
